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LEADERSHIP. SYMBOLIC ACTION AND STRATEGIC CHANGE’ 
“....It was a feudal castle. They had their lunch in the feudal canteen,‘the 
feudal barons called Burton turning up and administering the rites, and 
allowing employment to be granted: and there would be a medical man 
on the premises and a bit of billiards and a bowling green. So the whole 
of the village set up was really to show that we could protect you 
there . . . . . . . It had to go.” 
This is perhaps somewhat unusual language for the chief executive of a major 
corporation, but it is the way in which Sir Ralph Halpern described Hudson Mills, 
the company’s factory, and he saw the need for change in the ailing Burton retail 
empire in the mid 1970s. It contains elements of symbolic imagery which demonstrate 
an acute awareness of the importance of cultural dimensions of management: and 
many of his subsequent actions show that it was an awareness put to use in the 
managing of major strategic change in the company (Johnson,l989). 
There is growing awareness evident in the management literature of the links 
between corporate culture and strategy, and of the importance of symbolic action in 
the task of management (Dandridge et al, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981; Pondy et a1,1983). 
However explanations of links between symbolic activity, strategy development in 
organisations, the management of strategic change and the role of leaders as change 
agents, remain largely implicit. The aim here is to draw on the developing literature 
in the field, as well as empirical research by the author and others, to provide an 
explanatory model of such linkages. 
In exploring these linkages a number of explanatory propositions are developed. First 
that strategic change agency is a major leadership task yet a significant problem for 
corporate leaders. Second that the problem needs to be understood in the context of 
processes of strategy development in organisations which are characterised by 
incremental change (Quinn, 1980) and strategic “momentum” (Miller and Friesen, 1980) 
and, typically, a marked resistance to substantial change. Third that organisational 
symbols and symbolic action play a central role both in such incremental change but 
also in the management of more “global” (Mintzberg,l978) strategic change. And 
finally that symbolic action is of special value in the management of strategic change 
because of its peculiar capacity to deliver powerful strategic signals linked both to 
the past and to an uncertain future, in mundane ways, whilst coping with the 
ambiguity of change. 
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DEVELOPING VIEWS OF LEADERSHIP 
Whilst traditional views of leaders as objective setting,co-ordinators of precisely 
identified systems and skills still exist in the literature (eg Harmon and Jacobs,1985), 
there has been an increasing recognition of the multifaceted nature of leadership. 
Garfield (1986) sets out a range of characteristics for effective leadership. These 
include above all a visionary capacity, a quality commented on, if rather 
unspecifically, by most writers on leadership. Other characteristics are the abilities of 
team building and “team playing”; of focussing activity in defined ways and of 
learning from mistakes; personal characteristics of mental agility and concentration; 
of self-directedness and self- confidence as well as the evocation of trust and 
confidence and the ability to get commitment of others. Successful leaders also have 
a “constructive restlessness” such that they more readily see opportunities and can 
identify their significance in both general and highly specific organisational terms. 
Other personal qualities and characteristics such as a high degree of objectivity 
(Schein, 1985), an ability to handle ambiguity, contradiction and paradox 
(Kakabadse,l987; Quinn,1988) and the likelihood of a diverse career path with 
experience of other cultures (Schein,1985; Norburn,l986) are also noted. On top of all 
this it is emphasized that successful leaders are effective managers of change, though 
what this entails is not always made explicit. 
Garfield’s is as good a summary of the qualities of leadership that exists, but it not 
unusual in being a better catalogue than it is an explanation. “Vision” is explained in 
terms of “missions which motivate”; the ability to gain commitment and trust are 
emphasised and, above all, change agency is crucial: but what do these mean in terms 
of the mechanisms of management? Building on learning models of change, Schein 
(1985) argues that leaders need to be willing to unfreeze that which is taken for 
granted in the organisation and absorb the anger,anxiety and pain that this will bring. 
This process needs to be linked to a process of inducing a “cognitive re-definition” in 
others and providing a “safety net” for them so that they can internalise change. But 
how is all this to be done? And how does this all link to the problem which most 
chief executives claim is most difficult of all - the management of strategic change 
in organisations?. 
Writers on leadership emphasise visible personal commitment and an orientation 
towards deeds rather than words (eg Sashkin, 1987). Charismatic leaders, for 
example, “engage in exemplary acts that followers perceive as involving great 
personal risk, cost and energy” (Conger and Kanungo, 1987) and which both 
demonstrate the redundancy of the old order and give rise to trust and commitment. 
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As change agents, successful leaders therefore act as role models (Bennis and Nanus, 
1985). Some of what such leaders do in effecting change is therefore becoming 
clearer; but why is such action effective? 
Explanations emphasize the necessity of involving others, and understanding the 
problems and needs for change, through the eyes of others and in terms of the 
emotions of others (Zaleznik,1977). Byrd, for example, writes of the need for 
“corporate leaders to be in touch with their employees psychological, economic, 
safety, spiritual, sexual, aesthetic, and physical needs (Byrd,1987 p39). Peters and 
Austin (1985) suggest that it is important to communicate meaning and vision in a 
“mundane” way which relates to those in the organisation. It is here that the role of 
symbolic activity surfaces in explanations. Schein argues that it is necessary somehow 
to involve others in the process of change and get them to “own” change: he suggests 
that in breaking down that which is taken for granted, and in gaining acceptance of 
the new, the use of symbolic devices such as myths and stories are important (also 
Boje et al 1982). Pfeffer, too, suggests that “language, symbolism and ritual are 
important elements in the process of developing shared systems of belief and 
meaning” (Pfeffer,l981 ,p9); and Trite and Beyer (1985) show how organisational 
rituals are used to stimulate change. These are views echoed by Bennis and Nanus 
when they argue that leaders must employ a range of mechanisms in effecting change 
“from statements of policy that have minimum impact, to revising recruiting aims 
and methods, training that is explicitly geared to modify behaviour in support of new 
organisational values, and not least, adapting to and modifying shared symbols that 
signal and reinforce the new vision.“(Bennis and Nanus,1985,p143). 
LEADERSHIP AND SYMBOLIC ACTION 
There is, then, an emerging view in the literature that there is a link between the 
management of change and symbolic intervention and that this link is to do with the 
importance of relating changes in that which is taken for granted to new visions of 
strategy, but in terms and through means which are meaningful to those in the 
organisation. 
Certainly there is no disagreement here that this linkage is important: the author’s 
and others’ research, as well as many examples from recent the popular management 
literature, provide enough examples. 
Foster Brothers was a highly successful menswear retailer in the 1970s 
which experienced a dramatic profit downturn in the early 1980s. 
Johnson (1987) records the problems and means of promoting strategic 
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change in that company. Managers themselves recognized the extent to 
which staff were imbued with the company way of doing things - the 
extent to which they were “Fosterized”. The induction programmes for 
new staff, the stories of “heroes” of the past, and of dissenters who the 
“mafia” had got rid of, the insistence on company ways of dressing 
windows or promoting merchandise, the deferential way they were 
required to address the chief executive. The belief was that the company 
sold down market goods - “yobos uniforms” - to the uncritical “working 
lad”. These stories, rituals and language helped preserve a company 
culture at the root of which was an assumption that it was buying 
expertise that drove success. Attempts to change all this in the early 
1980s proved immensely difficult. Such progress as was made was not 
through rational argument or analysed evidence, though this was 
attempted. Rather it was through largely symbolic action of a small 
number of change agents. The consultant operating with this group 
insisted on calling the chief executive by his first name and publicly 
snubbing the powerful buying executives; development of new shops was 
managed through a quite different organisational structure ; the shops 
were substantially and visibly different and their success was magnified 
in stories throughout the shop network; staff were required to wear 
badges with their first names on them, and when this did not achieve 
sufficient change, they were required to wear merchandise from the new 
shops. This last move was very potent: as one of the executives involved 
remarked: “We did not realize the significance of (that); you see, they had 
to m the new strategy”. As the success of the changes became clearer, 
stories of hitherto unconvinced senior executives’ conversions to the new 
strategy spread through the organisation; and some of those most resistant 
to change were seen to exit the organisation. 
This is not an unusual account of change processes: other studies have shown similar 
patterns and examples: 
John Harvey Jones’ vision of ICI as a truly multinational firm was 
hampered by the highly segmentalist structure of the 1960’s and before. 
As Andrew Pettigrew showed (1985) divisions had become separate 
cultures with very little cross-communication and little hope of strategic 
integration. Below the levels of top management it was likely that 
individuals could not tell you who the Chief Executive of ICI was. 
Within a few months of John Harvey Jones taking the job ICI personnel 
identified, if nothing else, with the flowery ties and long hair of John 
Harvey Jones. 
Martin and Siehl (1983) show how John de Lorean in his time at GM 
deliberately promulgated stories to ridicule the dominant culture, 
introduced routines in direct contradiction of established values and 
underlined his refusal to accept such norms through dress and office 
decor. 
Peters and Waterman (1982) provide many illustrations of the symbolic 
action of corporate leaders: the stories that spread through Mars of 
Forrest Mars throwing badly wrapped Mars bars across the boardroom; of 
Ray Krok of &IcDonalds repeated emphasis of QSC and V .for Quality, 
Service, Cleanliness and Value. Of the language used to describe 
employees and customers: employees are “crew members” at McDonalds 
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and hosts at Disney; the evidence of the symbolic action of leaders goes 
on. 
We all know of further anecdotal examples. Kit Mcmahon of Midland 
Bank doing away with the staid be-suited image of bank employees and 
replacing them. with the Midland “collection” which came to symbolise 
staffs dedication to his new strategic approach. Of the director of a 
business school, intent on inculcating a research culture, he moved his 
computer terminal near to the foyer of the School and was seen visibly to 
be working at it as staff came in and out. Of the Chief Executive of a 
multinational hotel chain that not only promised a convention of travel 
agent directors of outstanding service he preceded to issue his home 
telephone number for each of them and ask for a personal report of any 
problems - action which the directors of the travel agents found was 
known by the hotel staff who served them at lunch. 
There is little doubt that the language used, the stories told or the ceremonies 
introduced are seen as significant by those corporate leaders who used them. There is 
also little doubt that such action has significant impact on managers, employees and 
customers of these organisations. However it is not entirely clear just what the links 
are between such symbolic action, the strategies of these firms and the management 
of strategic change by the corporate leaders themselves. The aim in the rest of this 
paper is to clarify the role of symbols and symbolic action in the development of 
organisational strategies, their tendency towards a persistent momentum, and also the 
management of their change. This is done by building on existing literature and the 
research by the author, reported elsewhere (Johnson,l987), to formalise a model of 
the links between strategy development in organisations and corporate culture; and 
the management of strategic change and symbolic action. 
PATTERNS IN STRATEGIC DECISION - MAKING 
Miller and Friesen (1980) characterise the development of strategy in organisation as 
a tendency towards “momentum”; reversals in the direction of change in variables of 
strategy and structure are infrequent and when they occur may be of a dramatic 
nature. It is an observation borne out by Chandler (1962), Greiner (1972), Mintzberg 
(1978) Grinyer and Spender (1979a) and Tushman and Romanelli (1986). Mintzberg 
(1978) found that most of the historical pattern of strategy development in an 
organisation could be described as periods of continuitv or incremental change. 
There have been an increasing number of studies which have sought to explain this 
incremental nature of strategic change. It is evident that rational, linear (Chaffe, 
1985) or synoptic (Frederickson, 1983) models of strategic decision making, so typical 
of normative models of strategic decision making, do not characterize management 
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behaviour (see Beyer, 1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Quinn, 1980; Pettigrew, 
1985; Johnson and Scholes, 1989), planning systems are not central to the formulation 
of strategy (Hall, 1973; Mintzberg et al, 1976), strategic options not systematically 
analysed (Fahey, 1981) and objectives often ill-defined, diverse and not agreed upon 
(Norburn & Grinyer, 1973/4), post-rationalised (Mintzberg et al, 1976), unstated, or 
very generalised (Quinn, 1980). There are those, however, who argue that managers 
consciously pursue incremental change by systematic environmental scanning and 
option evaluation within explicitly considered social and political organisational 
constraints; this is the “logical incrementalist” view of strategic management 
(Quinn,1980; Pondy,1983). 
However the incremental nature of strategy development needs to be squared with 
our understanding of management behaviour and cognition. We know that managers 
are “distinguished by very strong active experimentation skills and are very weak on 
reflective observation skills” (Kolb, 1974 p.33). Managers do not tend to consider in 
abstract, intellectual form the responses to perceived problems; rather they seek to 
enter active stages of problem resolution and implementation. Schon (1983) has 
argued that it is a mistake to think of managerial thought and managerial action as 
separable: management is characterised by thought or “reflection in action”, the 
continuing interweaving of cognition and action. As Weick (1983, ~223) argues: 
“when managers act, their thinking occurs concurrently”: there is a “presumption of 
logic” in meeting a situation, so action is natural and the thinking (in action) in turn 
endows the action itself with greater meaning. 
This notion of “enactment” (Weick, 1979)argues that present decisions are taken on 
the basis of past experience, and past experience confirmed by present action. So the 
uncertainty and ambiguity of decision making is reduced and becomes manageable. 
Schon argues similarly that such “perceptual sets” or “causal maps” provide the 
managers with “a repertoire of examples, images, understandings and actions (so 
when he) makes sense of a situation he perceived to be unique, he m it as 
something already present in his repertoire” (Schon, 1983, p.138). It is an emphasis 
on managerial experience also demonstrated by Argyris and Schon (1974, 1978). 
They show that “singp-loop learning ” is characterized by managers searching for 
solutions to problems, or behaving in ways in line with, or by detecting errors which 
can be defined in terms of, existing “theories in use”: and also that “theories in use” 
are very difficult to change, even when their “owners ” are able to spell them out and 
recognise the need for changing them. Kiesler and Sproull (1982) have noted other 
such mechanisms for preserving core managerial beliefs include the false inference of 
causality, overestimating facilitating reasons to utilise such beliefs and diminishing 
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inhibiting reasons (also Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), discounting disconfirming 
evidence and focussing on powerful facilitating reasons to support current practice 
(also Kozielecki, 1981), “perceiving or inferring events as correlated due to their 
fortuitous associative pairing of their mutual infrequent occurrence” (Kiesler and 
Sproull, 1982, p.553). There is, in short, substantial evidence that what is often 
loosely referred to as “managerial experience” is central to understanding the 
development of strategy in organisations. 
However, managerial experience should not be thought of as a purely individual 
phenomenon. There exist in organisations a “relatively coherent sets of beliefs that 
bind some people together and that explain their worlds in terms of cause and effect 
relations”. (Beyer, 1981, p.166). It is an organisational view of the world which 
helps interpret the changes the organisation and the individual within it meet. These 
sets of core beliefs and assumptions are variously referred to as “myths” (Hedberg and 
Jonsonn, 1977) “paradigms” (Sheldon, 1980; Dighton, 1980; Johnson, 1987) (the term 
used in the rest of this paper); “interpretative schemes” (Bartunek, 1984) and, if we 
follow Sathe, “ideational culture” - the “set of important assumptions (often unstated) 
that members of a community share in common” and which “govern communications, 
justifications and behaviour” (Sathe, 1985). These bonding and interpretative 
mechanisms, appear to be particular important the greater the degree of ambiguity or 
uncertainty in the organisation, where formal structures and bureaucratic procedures 
cope less well (Beyer, 198 1; Ouchi, 1980) and where there are less formal, more 
organic structures but long serving and stable membership (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). 
Still others (Spender, 1980; Grinyer and Spender, 1979; Huff, 1982) have argued that 
such ideologies exist a’t an industry level; that is managers within the same industry 
tend to subscribe to a similar set of beliefs and assumptions. The “recipe” is “an 
accepted set of beliefs about what is consistent, realistic and which outcomes will 
follow the commitment of resources to specified actions” (Grinyer and Spender, 1979, 
p.83). 
A STRATEGIC ROLE FOR ORGANISATIONAL SYMBOLISM 
It is not difficult to see that the process of enactment of strategy within bounded 
rationalities (March and Simon,l958) is likely to result in incremental strategic 
change. But what is the role and significance of organisational symbolism in this? 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Trite and Beyer (1984,1985) have shown the 
importance of organisational rituals and ceremonies in binding individuals in 
organisational actions. Stories, or myths, are also important not least because they 
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link current situations with the past and thus experiences of previous situations 
(Schrank and Abelson, 1977). Wilkins (1983) also argues that people tend to believe 
more readily that which is enshrined in myth which act as “vehicles for conception”, 
embracing within them complex explanations and thus providing “cognitive short 
cuts”: but more than this they may also communicate the “vision of the organisation’s 
mission or role”. 
The links between the paradigm, culture and symbolic acts, and strategy becomes 
clearer when it is remembered that the typical patterns of strategic development in 
organisations are incremental, or adaptive. Myths rituals and other symbolic aspects 
of organisations do not merely endow and encapsulate meaning on a transitory basis; 
they are enduring and resistant to change, as interventionists in organisations have 
found (e.g. see Pettigrew, 1985 and Marshall and McLean, 1985). In effect they are 
an important mechanism in preserving the assumptions and beliefs in which strategy 
is rooted. Indeed as Abravanel (1983) suggests myths mediate between likely 
contradictions and conflicts in what the organisation as a collectivity, or in its parts, 
sees itself as (or wishes to be) and what it has to be done on a day to day basis. 
Their is therefore to maintain legitimacy and “help us to get on with our work” 
(Abravanel, 1983, p.286) at times when the organisation is in flux, for example when 
core values and assumptions are under threat or being questioned as in situations of 
strategic change. 
The paradigm is also likely to relate to the limited range of capabilities based on its 
available routines and physical assets. “There is no ‘shelf of technologies’ external to 
the firm and available to all industry participants. A firm’s capabilities are defined 
very much by where it has been in the past and what it has done”. (Teece, 1985, p.60 
on Nelson and Winter, 1981); and these routines themselves can come to take on the 
role of organisational rituals which guide organisational action. It would be wrong to 
conceptualise the manager as re-constructing anew the “reality” of his task every time 
a problem or opportunity arises. Rather managers will be ritualized into familiarity 
with, and will learn to lean on the routines that have evolved in the organisation 
(Trite and Beyer,l984) such that they are likely to seek strategic opportunities as 
defined by them (Cohen, March and Olsen; 1972). 
Because the paradigm is socialised in terms of myths, rituals, routines and symbolic 
language and activity, new ways of doing things which move outside established 
norms will affect social systems and working relationships. Such change is likely to 
be perceived as threatening to present power groupings (Pettigrew, 1973; 
Johnson,l987) whose position arises from their association with the perceived 
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uncertainty reducing mechanisms of existing beliefs and assumptions -’ ,’ 
(Thompson,l967;Hickson et al,l971). There may well result greater group solidarity i/’ 
and the employment of organisational mechanisms to protect current norms,,..,,SueK’* 
protective mechanisms might include the denial of the competence of the protagonists 
of new ideas, the withholding of information, the control of recruitment (Pettigrew, 
1973) and the regulisation of divergent individuals to that which is organisationally 
acceptable, if necessary through rituals of intimidation (O’Day, 1974), degradation or 
passage (Trite and Beyer, 1985). 
Johnson (1987) has illustrated the way in which the paradigm is supported and 
preserved by symbolic artefacts and organisational systems (which themselves tend to 
take on symbolic significance) as shown in exhibit 1. 
MANAGING STRATEGIC CHANGE 
None of this is to say change does not take place within organisations. Ouchi (1980) 
shows how commonly held belief systems and values hold together potential 
divergence of interests or ambiguity of goals but separately argues that: 
“The loyalty produced by assumptions about goal congruences provides 
tremendous energy and willingness to adapt. The change problems come 
when organisational conditions are so radically altered that clan members 
must clearly violate their basic assumptions” (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983, 
p.479)“. 
EXHIBIT 1 
THE CULTURAL WEB OF AN ORGANISATION 
STORIES 
Rc MYTHS SYMUOLS 
STRUCTURES 
CONTROL ORGANISATIONAL 1 
SYSTEMS STRUC’I 
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It is a finding also supported by other writers on change. Grinyer and Spender (1979) 
show that strategic change may take place readily within the constraints of what they 
call the recipe, but infrequently outside it. Sheldon (1980) argues that organisations 
are likely to enter a “paradigmatic state” in which they cease to adapt in their 
environment, adjusting marginally within their paradigm. In such circumstances a 
“paradigmatic shift” will be required at some stage. Organisations may need to move 
from “first order change” to “second order change” (Witzlawick et al, 1974), to effect 
“global” strategic shifts (Mintzberg,l978). 
How are these more fundamental shifts in strategy likely to happen? Given the 
processes outlined above, strategy may become less and less in line with an 
“objective” environment, resulting in “strategic drift” (Johnson, 1987,1988). Such 
drift may occur for long periods of time as the organisation enters a period of flux 
(Mintzberg, 1978) during which there is a generally accepted lack of clarity about the 
strategic direction of the organisation. There is, however, not likely to be any clear 
consensus about what should be done about the situation, and still a strong adherence 
to cultural norms of the past. Pressures for change come into conflict with political 
groupings resistant to change (Fahey, 1981; Pettigrew, 1985; Johnson, 1987), which 
draw on values and symbols of the past to legitimize their stance. 
Sheldon (1980) observed processes of fundamental change and concluded that there 
has to be acknowledged evidence of the existing “paradigm” dying. Bartunek found 
that “second order change in interpretative schemes interact, resulting in a synthesis” 
(Bartunek, 1984, p.356). Like Grinyer and Spender (1979), she observed that such 
interaction typically began with a perceived crises which challenged the validity of 
existing interpretive schemes, and proceeded as a conflict ridden dialectic between 
existing and divergent!views (Bartunek, 1984). However, Biggart (1977), Martin and 
Siehl (1983) and Johnson (1987) have shown the importance of symbolic and political 
mechanisms in questioning and breaking down the adherence to current norms and 
political structures and building a “counterculture” as a necessary process if new 
approaches were to be accepted. 
As the paradigm becomes less fixed, so it is possible for new perspective to be 
introduced in the organisation which may lead to more fundamental changes. This is 
likely to be associated with the activities of “outsiders” (Johnson 1987) often in the 
form of new senior management (Grinyer & Spender, 1979a,b; Pettigrew, 1985) or as 
a result of takeover. Again, such outsiders may use political and symbolic 
mechanisms both to break down current assumptions and political structures and also 
signal change (Pettigrew, 1985; Johnson 1987) . The extent to which members of the 
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organisation internalize and comply with such change processes is likely to depend as 
much on symbolic aspects of change as on the intellectual case made for the change 
or the explicit reward and punishment systems associated with it. So much was 
illustrated in the examples given earlier, for example in the way in which the staff’s 
wearing of new merchandise in the new Fosters shops signified a personal 
involvement in the changes taking place. 
A SUMMARY OF THE ROLE OF SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY IN THE STRATEGY 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. 
The management of strategy is conceptualized as the most complex of managerial 
activities (Hickson et al,l986; Johnson and Scholes, 1989). Perhaps for this reason the 
literature on the subject has tended to emphasize rationalistic models of strategy 
formulation and change. However empirical studies of strategic management show 
that strategies are likely to evolve in organisations through the interpretation of 
external and internal stimuli on the basis of organisational paradigms, and through 
the predominance of organisational routines. This occurs within a social and political 
milieux in which symbolic artefacts tend to legitimize current assumptions and 
behaviour. The role of symbols and symbolic action therefore helps to explain the 
tendency towards a momentum in strategy development in organisations. 
In time organisations’ strategies are therefore likely to drift, to become less related to 
external stimuli resulting in growing disquiet about current strategy from within and 
outside the organisation. The organisation is likely to enter a period of flux in which 
there is a conflict between adherents of old ways and those that question these: again, 
the symbols of the organisation are likely to perform the role of legitimizing the 
norms of the past and therefore to constrain change. 
However there is evidence that in periods of more fundamental change, change 
agents are likely to manipulate such symbolic devices to signal challenges to that 
which is taken for granted and representative of the past. Moreover, they may seek 
to create their own symbolic devices as means of signalling a new order and 
providing substantial organisational evidence of its durability. 
Symbols and symbolic action therefore provide bases for both legitimizing the past 
yet potentially also signalling change. 
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LEADERSHIP,STRATEGIC CHANGE AND SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY: THE ROLE 
OF PARADOX. 
This paper set out to examine why symbolic activity is especially important for 
leaders in their crucial role as change agents. It began by reviewing what writers on 
leadership have argued as important qualities and characteristics of successful leaders. 
These included the ability to be visionary, yet focussed; and the ability to drive 
change yet to be in communion with the feelings and needs of the rest of those in 
the organisation. Quinn suggests that: “masters of management appear to act in 
paradoxical ways” (Quinn,1988 p4), a view echoed by Peters and Waterman (1982 
~287) who write that: 
“An effective leader must be the master of two ends of the spectrum: 
ideas at the highest level of abstraction and actions at the most mundane 
level of detail . . . . . ..With soaring, lofty visions that will generate excitement 
and enthusiasm for tens or hundreds of thousands of people......On the 
other hand , it seems the only way to instil1 enthusiasm is through scores 
of daily events......” 
Specifying further these paradoxes we see that a whole series exist : 
In strategy creation there is a need for vision yet detailed analysis. 
In achieving credibility there is a need to be seen as insightful yet action oriented 
In challenging the status quo there is a need to maintain this credibility whilst 
attacking the existing paradigm. 
In communicating strategic intent there is a need to encapsulate the complexity and 
vision of strategic thinking in mundane ways which have organisational meaning. 
In achieving commitment to strategy there is a need to achieve a focus of mission to 
overcome the ambiguity of a current situation likely to be in flux. 
In consolidating a new strategy there is the need to maintain performance whilst 
breaking down old approaches and assumptions. 
Pfeffer (1981) suggests that symbolic acts are important because they “legitimize” 
such leadership behaviour . The argument here is that such legitimization occurs 
because symbolic acts provide an organisational language with sufficient power and 
relevance yet requisite ambiguity to allow the bridging of these paradoxes situations, 
in the challenging, communicating, commitment creating and consolidation roles of 
implementing strategic change. A brief review of the power of symbolic action shows 
why. 
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i) First it is important to remember the extent to which the sort of organisational 
inertia and “strategic momentum” that the leader as change agent faces are likely to 
be preserved in symbolic ways. Schrank and Abelson (1977) and Martin et al (1983) 
note the extent to which organisational stories tend to be linked to the past; and 
Meyer (1982) shows how paradigms are preserved through stories and rituals. Berg 
(1987) argues that corporate artifacts can take on a totemistic role as they “embody 
the corporate soul” (p26), not least because they become perceived as highly specific 
to the organisation. The factory that Halpern described as a “feudal castle” had 
become just such a totem: but that meant that its closure,when it happened, signified 
much more than the trimming of surplus capacity; it was a powerful sign of a 
fundamental break with the past. The very fact of the close association of myths, 
rituals and symbolic artefacts with the past therefore provides for a powerful tool for 
challenging the taken for granted and signalling change. 
ii) Symbolic activity is also powerful because it is at one and the same time mundane 
(Peters,l978) in terms of organisational realities and substantial in terms of what it 
signifies; and it is for this reason that it plays an important role in the day to day 
management of the complexity we call strategy.The impact in Fosters of the staff 
wearing new merchandise again illustrates this point. 
iii) Symbolic means of communication provide a greater clarity than can be expected 
from analytic argument (Martin and Powers,l983). Peters and Austin quote a Procter 
and Gamble manager explaining the sort of activity which convinces employees of 
the centrality of product quality in the organisation : 
“After you’ve finished your first three hundred mile ride through the 
back hills of Tennessee at seventy miles an hour to look at one damned 
thirty four cent bar of soap,you understand that the . ..company is very, 
very serious about product quality. You don’t....need a detailed two 
hundred page manual to prove it to you” (Peters and Austin,p279). 
Yet it is just these two hundred page arguments, or their glossy presentational 
substitutes, that are often seen by chief executives as the appropriate medium for 
arguing strategy. 
iv) Symbolic acts and stories are the more powerful, and the leader as change agent 
might argue ,the more useful, because they appear to have a “life of their own” 
(Peters and Austin,l985), being repeated and promulgated over time through the 
organisation. The story of Forrest Mars and the throwing of Mars bars has survived 
for decades and is more enduring than any statement of policy. 
14 
v) Symbolic acts also have the benefit of glossing over excessive ambipuitv (Boje et 
al,l982;Wilkins,l983); they can illustrate desired ends without being ” too specific on 
outcome” (Pfeffer,l981), and therefore avoid the sort of objective assessment and 
scrutiny (Pfeffer,l981; Meyer and Rowan,l977) and cut through difficulties of 
interpretation (Boje et al,l982) that can delay or dilute action or commitment. 
vi) This, combined with the interpretative quality of symbolic acts, provides a 
further useful basis of communicating the ambiguity of change. It is doubtful if John 
Harvey Jones or John de Lorean analysed the impact that their dress or appearance 
would have on the change process; nor is it likely that their subordinates did. Rather 
meaning and relevance was created in terms of the actions they took and the changes 
they initiated. Sperber, in discussing the meaning of symbolic acts for the benefit of 
the semiologist, argues a view which is also appropriate here: 
“It is therefore not a question of discovering the meaning of symbolic 
representations but, on the contrary, of inventing a relevance and a place 
in the memory for them...“(Sperber, 1975,pll3). 
vii) Symbolic acts and language also have an emotive quality. Wilkins (1983) has 
demonstrated this as far as organisational stories are concerned and Peters and 
Waterman (1982) emphasize as much for stories, language and ritual. Activity at this 
level is therefore addressing the feelings of organisational members rather than the 
intellect alone. 
The difficulty, above all else, which the leader as change agent faces is that of 
overcoming the powerful agents of “strategic momentum” rooted in the organisational 
paradigm. These may take the form of executives whose power is based upon it or 
organisational members whose reality is defined by it. The change agent, - quite 
likely an outsider anyway - has to challenge that which is taken for granted and 
create commitment to a new vision. The symbolic mechanisms discussed here are 
powerful in coping with the paradoxes of managing such change: they have an 
organisationally specific emotive content which provides for clarity in terms of the 
everyday whilst coping with ambiguity, avoiding objective scrutiny and being 
sufficiently malleable to allow meaning to devolve upon them. 
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